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Abstract
Turkey's liberal financial markets have been facing serious destabilising effects of financial globalization.  
Turkey's  experience  with  liberalization  and  deregulation  and  open  financial  markets  have  been  
dissapointing. The most painful and explosive experience has taken place in the public sector deficits and  
indebtedness. This paper tries to discuss more serious sources of financial instability in the framework of the  
theory  of  the  fiscal  crises  of  the  state,  specifically,  the  theory  of  "bifurcation  of  monetary  and  real  
accumulation" and the consequent "socialization of debts". It reaches to the conclusion that financial flows 
were delinked and severed from real accumulation and real economic activities; private saving surpluses  
were shouldered by the public deficit.
1.Introduction
Turkey has "emerging" financial  markets.  The process of liberalization and deregulation began in 1980. 
Since mid-1989 Turkey is a financially open economy with a fully convertible currency. In terms of capital 
flows, it is far more open many European countries. Financial liberalization and financial deepening have not 
resulted in  a  significant  internalization of  the markets  or in providing useful net  transfer of funds.  Yet, 
Turkey's liberal financial markets have been facing serious destabilising effects of financial globalization. 
The general characteristics of Turkey's financial markets are extreme volatility and fragility.
2.Theoretical Framework
This paper tries to define more serious instability sources and tries to explain why Turkey's experience with 
liberalization and deregulation and open financial markets have been dissapointing after almost two long and 
paiunful decades of efforts. The most painful and explosive experience has taken place in the public sector. 
In Turkey, the most common explanation of the financial problems focuses on very high budget deficits and 
public sector borrowing requirements.  An alternative explanation finds the source of the problem in the 
timing and/or squencing and/or the degree of the liberalization and deregulation. However, explanations must 
take into account the fact  that  budget  deficits in Turkey exploded after  financial  liberalization,  they are 
financed by borrowing in domestic and international markets This paper, rather than concentrating solely on 
domestic policy failures, intends to elaborate on the explanations related to the effects of globilized financial 
markets  on causing and/or  intensifying the  problems of  macroeconomic instability,  especially  in  budget 
deficits. These explanations will be discussed in the framework of the theory of the fiscal crises of the state, 
specifically, the theory of "bifurcation of monetary and real accumulation" and the consequent "socialization 
of debts". This theory formulates an explanation why state debts are a functional necessity in deregulated 
global financial markets in order to secure monetary assets by transferring liabilities from the market forces 
to the state domain. 
The theory concentrates on the process in which money is severed from the rules as a public property and 
money  becomes  increasingly  privatized,  thus  money  bifurcates  from real  economic  relations.  Monetary 
accumulation and real accumulation become delinked from each other. The theory of delinking monetary and 
real accumulation and the fiscal crises of the state was developed by German economist Elmar Altvater 
(Altvater  1997).  This  theory  is  a  new interpretation  of  the  theory  of  fiscal  crises  of  the  state  that  was 
developed  in  the  1960's  and  1970's  to  analyze  the  simultaneity  of  a  growth  in  private  wealth  and  a 
corresponding increase in public poverty and public sector burdens. In the more recent interpretation, the 
focus  is  on  the  growth  in  private  financial  wealth,  increasing  poverty  in  real  accumulation  and  a 
corresponding  increase  in  public  deficits  and  public  debt.  Theories  that  concentrate  on  imperfections, 
instabilities,  fragility,  failures  and  crises  of  financial  markets  certainly  illuminate  how  monetary 
accuumulation works. However, we think that, the heart of the problem lies with the nature of financial 
accumulation. 
According to the theory, the substance of money is formed by production. However, after the dissolution of 
the gold standard and as foreign exchange and finance markets have been deregulated and computer money 
and financial  innovations developed enormously,  money has become "privatized".  Financial  transactions 
have very little to do with world trade and real investments any more. The monetary and real economy part 
company. Delinking of monetary and real accumulation happens when steering of profit use for real and 
monetary investment is separated. When profits are used for investment in real capital during the process of 
real accumulation, production increase, income and employment are stimulated. On the other hand, when 
profits are used for investment in financial assets, it results in competition on global financial markets. Thus, 
the development  of  financial  innovations means competition over  the division of  the  globally  produced 
surplus. This puts pressure on the profit rate of real assets, and difficulties with debt payments. When debtors 
are not in the position to service their debts ordinarily, credit risks increase. As creditors are willing to lend 
when risks can be wiped out, the global interest rate increases by the higher risk component. Thus, financial 
investments become potentially even more attractive than real investments. The competition for a share of 
global  value  added  becomes  even  more  severe.  Investing  in  financial  assets  instead  of  real  capital  is 
detrimental for debtors, also for medium and long term economic development and growth rates, making 
risks even higher, and making financial investment even more attractive. The bifurcation of money from real 
relations continues until it becomes clear that there is too little globally produced surplus to meat all the 
claims. A debt crisis sets in. 
In the following sections of the paper, we will try to examine several aspects of the process of delinking of 
monetary  accumulation  and  real  accumulation  has  evolved  in  Turkey  via  financial  deepening,  as  new 
financial instruments were introduced and financial openness showed its effects.
3.Liberalization and Deregulation in Turkey
The timing and the process of liberalization and opening up of foreign trade and capital markets started after 
Turkey fell into foreign debt payment problems in the late 1970's. The stabilization program began to be 
implemented under the International Monetary Fund conditionality. Foreign trade was liberalized basically in 
the early 1980's, and further in the process of joining the customs union with the European Union in 1996. 
Financial  deregulation  began  in  1981  when  controls  on  interest  rates  were  removed.  In  1984  foreign 
exchange trade was liberalized. In 1986 Istanbul Stock Exchange was reopened. In 1987 the central bank 
began open market operations. The benchmark date for financial liberalisation is 1989 when controls on 
capital movements were removed and Turkish currency became convertible. After this date Turkey became a 
financially open economy.
Below, we analyze the extend of foreign capital flows to Turkey and the share of capital flows in total 
domestic financial markets. We will concentrate on the period of 1987-1997, since it is a period during which 
trade liberalization and financial openness proceeded well.
A. Trade Openness and Current Account Balance
Trade liberalization resulted almost no increase in the importance of exports of goods Its share to the GDP 
was stuck around 12-13 percent. Rather, exports of services have risen and import of good and services has 
surged tremendously. The share of imports to the GDP rose from around 15 percent to 30 percent. Trade 
openness increased continuously. as the share of foreign trade to the GDP rose from 25-30 percent to around 
55 percent. Trade openness resulted in higher dependency on imports. Trade account deficit deteriorated 
continuously  which  jumped  by  almost  three  times,  from around  4  percent  to  11  percent  of  the  GDP. 
However, .as trade account deficit was deteriorating, service incomes were growing. Thus, during this period 
Turkey did not face seriously high current account deficit 
B. Current Account Balance and Foreign Capital Flows
Table (1) shows current account balance and foreign capital flows to Turkey as ratios to the GDP. Table (1) 
shows net inflows and outflows of foreign capital. The volume showed an increasing trend. Thus net flows as 
a  percent  of  the  GDP  has  an  increasing  tendency.  This  is  expected,  since  the  correlation  between 
liberalization and capital mobility generally is high.
 
In the early1990's there were important amounts of capital inflows, mostly in short-term capital. However, 
Turkey experienced net outflows of capital in 1988, 1991 and 1994. In 1995-1997, capital inflows were 
higher  than  those  in  the  previous  inflow  periods,  reaching  5  percent  of  the  GDP.  Again,  short-term 
movements were more important. The composition of capital flows changed over the period. Foreign direct 
investment was very disappointing in volume and in its ratio to the GDP. It was never higher than around 
half a percentage point. In addition, its paak was juust before capital account liberalization in 1989. Net 
portfolio investments were positive along these years. Their ratio to the GDP was relatively higher only in 
1992  and  1993.  There  is  no  systematic  information  about  the  type  of  portfolio  flows  going  into  debt 
securities  or  shares.  Foreign  capital  flows  to  and  from Istanbul  Securities  Exchange  were  ridden  with 
fluctuations. There were surges in 1988-9, 1992-93. Declines or reversals were severe in 1990, 1991, 1994 
and 1996.
In recent years, the most important flows were in short term capital. Short term credit use and changes in the 
reserves and asset holdings of commercial banks were determinants of these flows. The movement of funds 
between commercial banks and the central bank related to reserve positions influenced net short-term capital 
movements. This results in the inclusion of transactions between domestic entities. Thus, balance of payment 
statistics does no longer represent transactions between foreigners and nationals. Turkey was a net payer of 
short-term credit in 1988, 1991 and 1994 in which years Turkey experienced financial crisis.
In 1987-1995, Turkey was a net payer of medium and long term credit, except in 1987 and 1993. Only in 
1996 and 1997 net flows took place, mainly as a result of some tax exemptions of firms and commercial 
banks for borrowing for longer maturity than one year. In 1997, borrowing was switched from short term to 
medium term.
In total, foreign capital flows did not provide significant and dependable amount of funds; they proceeded 
literally  by  bursts  and  busts;  also,  a  systematic  degree  of  diversification  in  capital  flows  could  not  be 
observed. Turkey experienced foreign capital inflow surge in 1990 when capital account liberalization was in 
effect. The Gulf Crisis put a very serious break on this. In 1992-1993 there was another surge which was 
interrupted and reversed by 1994 financial and following real crises. In 1996-1997 there was an even higher 
inflow mainly in the form of short-term capital movements. These were again interrupted and reversed by 
1998 word-wide crises. As the importance of portfolio investment and short-term loans increased, Turkey 
faced with the types of capital inflows that could be reversed abruptly. As a matter of fact, both types of 
capital showed similar patterns in inflows and outflows.
We should evaluate foreign capital flows in relation with the current account balance. The current account 
balance shows an erratic pattern. During the period it was in deficit in seven years, in surplus in four years. 
When in deficit, it was quite small, around 1.5-2 percent of the GDP. Nevertheless, last two years it was 
showing increases,  climbing to  around 3 percent.  These levels  were not  indicating a serious balance of 
payments problem. However, beneith this appearance, certain signs indicate that the relationship between 
current account balance, foreign capital movements and the real side of the economy were becoming apart 
and delinked. We will concentrate on three areas of connection: Errors and omissions; actual and optimal 
current account positions; and reserve movements.
One of the characteristics of current account statistics is that the "net errors and omissions" item which shows 
unrecorded transactions has become so important as to change the current account balance very considerably. 
This is  obviously the result  of the deregulation of capital  movements that makes difficult to capture all 
transactions. As a matter of fact, net errors and ommissions are accepted as short-term capital movements as 
called "hot money" that moves for speculative purposes.
A comparison of  actual  and  optimal  current  account  balance  positions  could  be  served to  establish the 
relationship between current account balance and the real side of the economy represented by optimal current 
account. Actual and optimal current account balance positions for the Turkish economy was tested by a study 
(Akcay and Ozler 1998:44-45). This study used a model that does quite well in capturing the current account 
shifts of a large number of developed as well as less developed countries. The application of this model 
showed large divergences between actual and optimal current account balance positions. The actual current 
account balance was found to be larger than the optimal current account balance. Since there was almost no 
capital  account  restrictions,  the deviations  could not be interpreted as an indication of imperfect  capital 
mobility. The writers came to the conclusion that the higher variance of the current account movements after 
1989  could  be  interpreted  as  an  indication  of  the  presence  of  speculative  capital  movements,  and  not 
restrictions of capital flows. Thus, the relationship between current account balance and the real side of the 
economy became apart and delinked.
In  addition,  the  relationship  between  current  account  balance  and  total  foreign  capital  flows  diverged 
considerably, as can be seen from Table (1). The difference was taken up by foreign exchange reserves. The 
volatility of foreign capital movements and the monetary policy that had to be adapted to financial openness 
were directly reflected in and taken up by foreign exchange reserves. The relationship between the current 
account  deficit  and  capital  flows was weakened especially  after  1995.  This  means that  the  relationship 
between the real economy's external gap represented by the current account deficit (which also reflects the 
saving-investment gap) and foreign capital flows wakened. Because. the reserve movements to the GDP ratio 
were very close to the current account deficit to the GDP ratio since 1995. This means that this relationship 
was even severed.
C. External Capital Flows and Internal Capital
During the period, the ratio of investment to the GNP did not change much whereas the ratio of total bank 
credits increased by 20 percent, that of portfolio assts by three times. Even if foreign capital flows may seem 
small relative to the GDP, their volume may be important relative to internal real and financial investments. 
However, in the case of Turkey this was not true for foreign direct investments and portfolio investments. 
Table (2) shows the share of foreign capital flows in total investment and financial assets. Foreign direct 
investment  was  never  higher  than  2.79  percent  of  total  investments,  and  relatively  higher  shares  were 
observed in the first years of financial liberalization. Later, it had a declining trend, falling to around percent 
in 1997. Capital account liberalization failed to attract real investment funds. Foreign portfolio investments in 
relative terms fluctuated considerably. They were important relative to the total in 1988, 1989, 1992 and 
1993. Then they fell especially as short-term credits increased. In 1997, their relative share was no larger 
than that was in 1987. However, what is important, as their share fluctuated, they caused serious instabilities 
in financial  markets.  Considering that  an important  part  of foreign portfolio investment  appear to go in 
treasury bills and bonds, the fluctuations affect directly budget financing. As we will analyse below, the 
pattern of financing budget deficits.and their relation with the monetary side of the economy has bifurcated 
severely  from the  real  side  of  the  economy.  Thus,  at  least  some  part  of  foreign  portfolio  investments 
contributed to the delinking.
 
As mentioned earlier, systematic information is not avaiable on the foreign share in the stockmarket. A recent 
comprehensive  study  by  Gunes  and  Saltoglu  on  the  Istanbul  Stock  Exchange  states  that,  due  to  data 
insufficiency,  the  issue  of  foreign  investment  on  stocks  could  not  be  analysed  (Gunes  and  Saltoglu 
1998:121). The total volume increased from 1.5 percent to the to around 30 percent during the period. The 
study analysed econometrically the movements of stock earnings and sources of extreme volatility. It found 
that the movements of earning rates could not be explained by any macroeconomic and financial factors, 
meaning that earning movements were determined outside the basic macroeconomic and financial relations; 
there were no macroeconomic and financial basis for earnings volatility. The stock exchange market was not 
related to other markets and the overall macroeconomic system. It operated in a speculative and manipulative 
manner. The volatility was related to daily transactions that were not in line with macroeconomic influences. 
Even if economic fundamentals and parameters did not change,  the stock market experienced very high 
volatility. This volatility was determined essentially within the market itself and by speculation. (Gunes and 
Saltoglu 1998:64-67, 109, 121, 136). Thus, whatever the role foreign portfolio investments played in the 
stock market, the market itself is not related to the real economy, circulating significant amount of money for 
speculative and manipulative manners,  absorbing resources from real  accumulation,  contributing only to 
financial instability.
Financial volatility and instabilities are even much greater in credit markets. The ratios of foreign credit 
relative to the internal credit  volumes were much bigger and erratic compared to other types of foreign 
capital flows. As explained above, short-term foreign credit flows are much more important. Also, Turkish 
credit supply is largely short-term. During the period, the volumes of these foreign flows were increasing and 
the ratios of inflows and outflows were getting bigger. Such leaps and bounces and busts reaching minus 29 
percent and plus 24 percent within a period of only three years in 1994-1996, drove the economy extremely 
unstable.  Any real  economic foundations cannot possibly explain these movements.  Thus,  foreign credit 
flows relative to the determinants total credit extension in Turkey were severed. However, the effects of these 
erratic flows on growth rates of the economy were serious. As Table (2) shows, in every year that foreign 
credit outflows took place, growth rates were very low or negative.
4. Financial Accumulation after Financial Liberalization
A. Pattern of Financial Deepening
Between 1987 and 1997, financial deepening proceeded as the ratio of total financial assets to the GNP rose 
from 37.3 to 67.1 percent (Capital Market Board; The Banks Association of Turkey). The most important 
form of financial assets was still bank deposit, though its weight fell from almost three fourths to two thirds. 
Thus, the share of total securities increased from 27 to 36 percent. The most prominent change was in the 
increase in foreign exchange denominated deposits that became as large as the Turkish Lira denominated 
deposits. Private securities were issued mostly in the form of shares. Corporate bond issues were minimal. 
Private securities had a 15 percent share in 1991 at its highest. This share fell to less than 5 percent in 1997. 
Financial deepening took place essentially in public securities. Around one third of the total financial assets 
were comprised of public securities. The weight of public securities in the total had reached to 87 percent in 
1997.  In  short,  financial  liberalization,  deregulation  and  deepening  resulted  essentially  in  currency 
substitution and public sector borrowing. In addition, both deposits and securities were concentrated in short-
term and very short-term assets.
B. Financial Accumulation and the Banking Sector
The biggest financial sector is still the banking sector and it has grown relative to the GNP. The ratio of the 
total balance sheet of the banking sector to the GNP reached to 60 percent in 1997 (The Banks Association of 
Turkey 1998). The pattern of financial accumulation that took place within and through the banking sector 
created serious systemic risks and resulted in a bifurcation of financial accumulation and real accumulation. 
We will summarize some of them below.
The source of the growth of the banking sector assets was deposits, especially forex deposits. Deposits were 
concentrated  in  short-term  deposits,  as  economic  and  financial  instabilities  increased  after  financial 
liberalization. In order to protect deposits from price increases and currency devaluation or to benefit from a 
major  devaluation,  deposits  were  increasingly  held  in  foreign  currency.  The  whole  process  was  also 
influenced by a complete deposit guarantee since the 1994 financial breakdown. In addition, around 40-45 
percent of credits extended was denominated in foreign exchange. Thus, credits were also subject to currency 
substitution. 
The banking sector, especially the commercial banking sector, has moved away from its basic function of 
providing credit to the real sector and especially to the industry. The ratio of their credits to their deposits 
was a little more than 50 percent. Bank credits were around 40 percent of their total assets. Instead of credit 
extension, banks were buying government bonds and treasury bills. In 1997, banks were holding almost 85 
percent of government securities. However, as we will see below, government borrowing has not been used 
for real capital accumulation. Therefore, financial development was proceeding with a weaker relation to the 
real sector of the economy.
Another consequence of financial liberalization was an increasing use of derivative instruments and repos. 
This  was  shown  by  the  so-called  "off-balance  sheet  account"  of  the  banking  system.  This  includes 
transactions that do not take place in the regular balance sheet. Off-balance transactions comprise guarantees, 
warrantees, and more importantly, foreign exchange and interest rate transactions and commitments, futures, 
swaps and options and repos.  In recent years,  these transactions were growing much faster than regular 
balance-sheet items. They amounted to a volume that corresponded to 92 percent of the total regular balance-
sheet assets, or, 45 percent of the GNP. The main source of this growth was increases in forward foreign 
exchange purchases and sales, and especially repos. The growth was fast since 1995 as short-term foreign 
capital flows were increasing. Private commercial banks carried around three-fourths of these transactions 
(Banks Association of Turkey 1997:I-48-49; 1998:II-11). Open market operations and repo operations are 
directly related to the borrowing operations and liquidity requirements of the treasury. Therefore, a part of 
the off-balance operations of banks is also a part of the relation between banks and public borrowing. The 
growth in  these extremely liquid funds  is  a  very important  indicator  that  the  monetary world has been 
growing and bifurcating from the real economy.
C. Financial Accumulation and Fiscal Crisis of the State
The most prominent and the most urgent economic and political  problem facing Turkey today is public 
deficit  and  its  financing.  Therefore,  the  management  of  fiscal  deficit  is  the  center  of  general  economic 
management. It is a widely held view that financial instability in Turkey is not arising from international 
financial integration and foreign capital flows per se; on the contrary, Turkey's public deficit is making the 
country risk so high as to shape the pattern of foreign capital flows. This may be true for today. However, 
this argument ignores the fact that the process of deterioration in public deficit was basically determined by 
the general structure of the liberalization in the public sector, finance, and foreign exchange and capital 
movements, the process that started in the early years of the 1980's. The major effects of liberalization on 
public finance were through significantly devalued foreign exchange rates, hiked interest  rates and great 
losses in tax revenues. All these effects resulted in increases in public borrowing and put a great pressure on 
the debt payment capacity of the public sector.
During this process, the public sector overtook the saving deficit of the private sector and the credit demand 
deficit of the banking sector. Banks were facing difficulties in placing credit funds due to very high interest 
rates  an economic slowdown.  Meanwhile,  as  public  revenues were lost  and borrowing needs  increased, 
foreign borrowing conditions worsened due to international debt crises. Thus, the public sector resorted to 
domestic financing for deficit financing. This is how the banking sector became the major credit giver to the 
public sector and how it became the holder of 85 percent of public securities. Short-term foreign capital 
flows also circulate through the banking system mostly to buy short-term government securities. The main 
reason for an increasing need to borrow was a dramatic decrease in tax revenues. One of the major aims of 
the policy of liberalization was to reduce the size of the public sector. Taxes were reduced and generous tax 
incentives were provided to promote the private sector and exports. From 1981 to 1984 the tax ratio fell by 
25 percent. This was a direct takeover the saving deficit of the private sector by the public sector. Due to 
declines in taxes, the savings of the private sector increased dramatically; and the private saving-investment 
gap turned to a surplus in 1986, continued to be in surplus until 1995.
Since the beginning of financial liberalization, not only banks, but also private sector enterprises, especially 
big ones have used important parts of their busines funds to earn interest income. According to the periodical 
study done by The Istanbul Chamber of Industry on the biggest 500 industrial establishments of Turkey, an 
average of fifty five percent of earnings of these establishments were from other activities than their main 
activities  and  from public  debt  instruments  and  repos  (Istanbul  Sanayi  Odasi  1998:86,  200).  These  big 
establisment were not using these earnings for investment and banks were not using their funds to enlarge 
credits for real accumulation.Private surpluses that were borrowed by the public sector were not used to to 
close the public saving-investment gap and public investments. In fact, they were not used even for current 
public services. After 1994, interest payments from the budget reached 8 to 10 percent of the GNP; the PSPR 
ratio  to  the  GNP  was  moving  between  8  and  12  percent,  whereas  the  budget  was  producing  primary 
surpluses. Borrowing was mostly for rolling over of debt and interest  payments.  Interest  payments have 
finally come to swallow forty percent of the consolidated budget.
5. Conclusion
In Turkey, financial liberalization since 1989 resulted mainly in currency substitution and public debt, private 
surpluses and public deficits. The relationship between savings and productive investments is delinked. The 
relationship between foreign and domestic borrowing for deficit  financing and public service and public 
investment financing has been severed. 
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